This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas’ economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of “states and thick markets” versus “anarchy and thin markets.”

本文通过日本忍者社区的例子研究了无政府状态实现高贸易平衡的可能性。最初，伊贺和甲贺山区的忍者是无国籍的，经常发生争执，交流的机会很少。随着 16 世纪内战的到来，忍者的经济状况发生了变化。佣兵市场显着扩大，为忍者提供了巨大的盈利机会。然而，忍者们并没有建立一个正式的政府来实现更高的贸易平衡，而是诉诸于组建由私人宪法联合起来的自愿联盟。我认为这种发展是可能的，因为战国时期的制度环境促成了自治制度和原则的框架。忍者能够以非常低的组织成本在此框架上进行构建。结果，忍者们能够在保持无国籍状态的同时在雇佣军市场上获得巨大的经济收益——这一看似矛盾的发展与“国家和密集市场”与“无政府状态和薄弱市场”的标准二分法背道而驰。