ABSTRACT

I use game-theoretic models to compare a sender's expected payoff across two methods of wielding influence under asymmetric information: offering rewards and threatening sanctions. Attempts to influence the actions of another can have the perverse effect of actually encouraging the behavior that one is trying to discourage by creating incentives to bluff, which may differ across foreign policy regimes. Under a reward regime, targets can bluff to extort larger inducements. Under a sanction regime, targets can bluff to deter coercion attempts. I find that while sanctions are a weakly dominant tool of influence under complete information, rewards can be preferable under incomplete information. Specifically, the sender finds promises more beneficial than threats if she expects that (i) coercion would likely fail and (ii) her willingness to offer bribes would not get exploited by the target. I examine the United States' foreign policy reversal from punishments to inducements towards North Korea during the nuclear crisis of 1993--4 to illustrate these theoretical propositions.

摘要

我使用博弈论模型来比较发送者在不对称信息下施加影响的两种方法的预期收益：提供奖励和威胁制裁。试图影响另一个人的行为可能会产生反常的效果，实际上鼓励一个人试图通过鼓励虚张声势来阻止的行为，这可能因外交政策制度而异。在奖励制度下，目标可以虚张声势以勒索更大的诱因。在制裁制度下，目标可以虚张声势以阻止胁迫企图。我发现，虽然制裁在完整信息下是一种微弱的影响工具，但在不完整信息下奖励可能更可取。具体来说，如果发送者预期 (i) 胁迫可能会失败并且 (ii) 她提供贿赂的意愿不会被目标利用，则发送者会发现承诺比威胁更有益。我考察了美国在 1993--4 核危机期间对朝鲜的外交政策从惩罚转向利诱的转变，以说明这些理论命题。