当前位置: X-MOL 学术American Business Law Journal › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Strategic Surrogates or Sad Sinners: U.S. Taxation of Bartering in Digital Services
American Business Law Journal ( IF 1.743 ) Pub Date : 2021-12-10 , DOI: 10.1111/ablj.12196
Mark J. Cowan 1 , Joshua Cutler 2 , Ryan J. Baxter 3
Affiliation  

The COVID-19 pandemic caused both a surge in technology use and a deterioration in government finances. At the same time, big tech companies are under scrutiny by lawmakers for tax avoidance, antitrust issues, and other concerns. These realities call for governments to reassess tax policy toward tech companies and for tech companies to reassess legal strategy toward taxes. State and federal governments' tax bases are eroding because of the noncash, barter nature of modern transactions. When a taxpayer uses “free” digital services such as e-mail, social media, or search engines, she pays via access to her personal data or attention. From a legal and policy standpoint, these barter transactions should be taxed just as if cash had changed hands, but because it is not practicable to identify, value, and tax the data and time of each user, they have escaped taxation, giving many tech companies an unintended tax advantage. To address this unfairness, this article proposes a surrogate tax, through which the tech company acts as a proxy to pay the tax that is technically the liability of its users. In contrast to Digital Services Taxes (DSTs), which have been the main focus of policy makers and the extant literature, surrogate taxes adhere closely to standards of good tax policy, providing an administrable means of capturing untaxed digital barter while advancing fairness across the industry's business models. From a legal strategy standpoint, this article argues that tech companies themselves should support surrogate taxes, to avoid facing more onerous, “sin”-like taxes, such as DSTs.

中文翻译:

战略代理人或可悲的罪人:美国对数字服务易货交易的税收

COVID-19 大流行导致技术使用激增和政府财政恶化。与此同时,大型科技公司因避税、反垄断问题和其他问题而受到立法者的审查。这些现实要求政府重新评估对科技公司的税收政策,并要求科技公司重新评估税收的法律战略。由于现代交易的非现金、易货性质,州和联邦政府的税基正在侵蚀。当纳税人使用电子邮件、社交媒体或搜索引擎等“免费”数字服务时,她通过访问她的个人数据或关注来支付费用。从法律和政策的角度来看,这些易货交易应该像现金易手一样被征税,但是因为识别、评估和征税每个用户的数据和时间是不切实际的,他们逃税了,给许多科技公司带来了意想不到的税收优势。为了解决这种不公平问题,本文提出了一种替代税,科技公司通过该税充当代理支付从技术上讲是其用户责任的税款。与一直是政策制定者和现有文献的主要关注点的数字服务税 (DST) 相比,替代税严格遵守良好税收政策的标准,提供了一种可管理的方式来捕获未征税的数字易货贸易,同时促进整个行业的公平性。商业模式。从法律策略的角度来看,本文认为科技公司本身应该支持替代税,以避免面临更繁重的、类似“罪恶”的税收,例如 DST。为了解决这种不公平问题,本文提出了一种替代税,科技公司通过该税充当代理支付从技术上讲是其用户责任的税款。与一直是政策制定者和现有文献的主要关注点的数字服务税 (DST) 相比,替代税严格遵守良好税收政策的标准,提供了一种可管理的方式来捕获未征税的数字易货贸易,同时促进整个行业的公平性。商业模式。从法律策略的角度来看,本文认为科技公司本身应该支持替代税,以避免面临更繁重的、类似“罪恶”的税收,例如 DST。为了解决这种不公平问题,本文提出了一种替代税,科技公司通过该税充当代理支付从技术上讲是其用户责任的税款。与一直是政策制定者和现有文献的主要关注点的数字服务税 (DST) 相比,替代税严格遵守良好税收政策的标准,提供了一种可管理的方式来捕获未征税的数字易货贸易,同时促进整个行业的公平性。商业模式。从法律策略的角度来看,本文认为科技公司本身应该支持替代税,以避免面临更繁重的、类似“罪恶”的税收,例如 DST。与一直是政策制定者和现有文献的主要关注点的数字服务税 (DST) 相比,替代税严格遵守良好税收政策的标准,提供了一种可管理的方式来捕获未征税的数字易货贸易,同时促进整个行业的公平性。商业模式。从法律策略的角度来看,本文认为科技公司本身应该支持替代税,以避免面临更繁重的、类似“罪恶”的税收,例如 DST。与一直是政策制定者和现有文献的主要关注点的数字服务税 (DST) 相比,替代税严格遵守良好税收政策的标准,提供了一种可管理的方式来捕获未征税的数字易货贸易,同时促进整个行业的公平性。商业模式。从法律策略的角度来看,本文认为科技公司本身应该支持替代税,以避免面临更繁重的、类似“罪恶”的税收,例如 DST。
更新日期:2022-02-11
down
wechat
bug