Aid and social programs are commonly used to fight insurgencies. However, sometimes they fail to achieve their goal of increasing citizen cooperation with the state. I propose a series of game-theoretic models that focus on the strategic interaction between a state and a citizen in the face of a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power by an insurgency. I argue that even if the provision of aid or social programs increases citizens’ intrinsic motivation to cooperate with the state, it does not necessarily translate into more cooperation. I show that citizen cooperation depends on whether the increase in the provision of aid is accompanied by an increase in the use of violent or hard tools by the state, the citizens’ expectation of future rewards, and the insurgency’s response. The models thus provide a rationale for why even if social programs increase state legitimacy, they may fail to increase citizen cooperation.

援助和社会计划通常用于打击叛乱。然而，有时他们未能实现增加公民与国家合作的目标。我提出了一系列博弈论模型，这些模型侧重于面对叛乱对国家垄断权力的挑战时国家与公民之间的战略互动。我认为，即使提供援助或社会计划增加了公民与国家合作的内在动机，也不一定转化为更多的合作。我表明，公民合作取决于提供援助的增加是否伴随着使用暴力或强硬手段的增加。国家的工具、公民对未来回报的期望以及叛乱的反应。因此，这些模型为为什么即使社会计划增加了国家合法性，它们也可能无法增加公民合作提供了一个基本原理。