Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa.

中文翻译：

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身体、自我和他者：关于主体间性的哈丁、萨特和梅洛-庞蒂

道格拉斯·哈丁 (Douglas Harding) 开发了一种独特的第一人称实验方法，用于研究在学术界仍然相对未知的意识。在这篇论文中，我展示了哈丁、萨特和梅洛-庞蒂之间关于身体现象学和主体间性的批判性对话。像萨特和梅洛-庞蒂一样，哈丁观察到，从第一人称的角度来看，我看不到自己的头。他指出，从视觉上讲，没有什么会妨碍他人。我对他人和世界完全开放。我的躯体体验也没有在我和世界之间建立界限。与其将这些感觉作为有边界的、有形的事物（身体）的一部分来体验，还需要引入他人的观点。读者将通过一系列哈丁的第一人称实验来亲自检验这些现象学主张。对萨特来说，他者的主观性是通过《看》得知的，这使我成为他们的纯粹客体。梅洛-庞蒂批评萨特使主体间关系主要是冲突关系。相反，他认为我的身体的意向性与其他人的身体的意向性有着原始的联系。我们已经处于一个共享的社会世界中。对于哈丁来说，就像萨特一样，我的意识是一种虚无；然而，与萨特相反，它并不否定世界，而是与世界绝对统一。对抗是一种错觉，它来自想象我在一张脸后面。而是在生活中的个人关系中，我变成了另一个人。