ABSTRACT

States form military alliances for the security benefits they provide. Despite this common purpose of military alliances, alliances vary a great deal in their design. Notably, some states form alliances that involve extensive peacetime military coordination while others form alliances with minimal peacetime military coordination. I argue that this variation in alliance design is motivated by the bargaining power of any challengers the members face. When a state faces a relatively weak challenger it will not have an incentive to pay the greater cost associated with a high level of peacetime coordination because a low level of peacetime military coordination will deter the challenger. However, if a state faces a relatively strong challenger a low level of peacetime military coordination will fail to deter the challenger and, thus, it will be willing to pay the additional costs associated with a high level of peacetime military coordination. An empirical analysis of the design of alliances from 1816 to 2001 supports hypotheses derived from the argument. The findings highlight how the design of alliances is driven, in part, by the characteristics of nonmembers.

摘要

各国为了提供安全利益而结成军事联盟。尽管军事联盟有着共同的目的，但联盟的设计却大相径庭。值得注意的是，一些国家结成联盟，涉及广泛的和平时期军事协调，而另一些国家结成联盟，和平时期军事协调最少。我认为，联盟设计的这种变化是由成员面临的任何挑战者的讨价还价能力推动的。当一个国家面对一个相对较弱的挑战者时，它不会有动力支付与和平时期高水平协调相关的更大成本，因为和平时期低水平的军事协调会阻止挑战者。然而，如果一个国家面临一个相对强大的挑战者，那么和平时期低水平的军事协调将无法威慑挑战者，因此，它愿意支付与和平时期高水平军事协调相关的额外费用。对 1816 年至 2001 年联盟设计的实证分析支持从该论点得出的假设。研究结果强调了联盟的设计部分是如何由非成员的特征驱动的。