Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing.

中文翻译：

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公地配给

为了公平，公共资源可能会以低效的政策进行管理。我们研究了在印度拉贾斯坦邦农业地下水使用的背景下，公地配给如何影响资源使用的效率和公平性。我们发现配给与投入使用有关，因此农民尽管取水价格微不足道，但平均使用社会最佳水量。配给制度仍然非常低效，因为它在农民之间分配错误，降低了生产力。庇古改革将使农业盈余增加 12% 的家庭收入，但远未达到对配给的帕累托改进。