Within just 7 years, behavioral decision research in psychology underwent a dramatic change: In 1967, Peterson and Beach (1967) reviewed more than 160 experiments concerned with people's statistical intuitions. Invoking the metaphor of the mind as an intuitive statistician, they concluded that "probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models that integrate and account for human performance in a wide range of inferential tasks" (p. 29). Yet in a 1974 Science article, Tversky and Kahneman rejected this conclusion, arguing that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations" (p. 1124). With that, they introduced the heuristics-and-biases research program, which has profoundly altered how psychology, and the behavioral sciences more generally, view the mind's competences and rationality. How was this radical transformation possible? We examine a previously neglected driver: The heuristics-and-biases program established an experimental protocol in behavioral decision research that relied on described scenarios rather than learning and experience. We demonstrate this shift with an analysis of 604 experiments, which shows that the descriptive protocol has dominated post-1974 research. Specifically, we examine two lines of research addressed in the intuitive-statistician program (Bayesian reasoning and judgments of compound events) and two lines of research spurred by the heuristics-and-biases program (framing and anchoring and adjustment). We conclude that the focus on description at the expense of learning has profoundly shaped the influential view of the error-proneness of human cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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实验方法如何塑造对人类能力和理性的看法。

在短短 7 年内，心理学中的行为决策研究发生了巨大的变化：1967 年，Peterson 和 Beach (1967) 回顾了 160 多个与人们的统计直觉有关的实验。他们将心灵比喻为直觉的统计学家，得出结论：“概率论和统计学可以用作心理模型的基础，这些模型整合并解释了人类在广泛的推理任务中的表现”（第 29 页）。然而，在 1974 年的《科学》文章中，Tversky 和 ​​Kahneman 拒绝了这一结论，认为“人们依赖于有限数量的启发式原则，这些原则将评估概率和预测值的复杂任务简化为简单的判断操作”（第 1124 页）。有了这个，他们引入了启发式和偏见研究计划，这深刻地改变了心理学以及更普遍的行为科学如何看待心灵的能力和理性。这种彻底的转变是如何可能的？我们研究了一个以前被忽视的驱动因素：启发式和偏见计划在行为决策研究中建立了一个实验协议，该协议依赖于描述的场景而不是学习和经验。我们通过对 604 个实验的分析证明了这种转变，这表明描述性协议在 1974 年后的研究中占主导地位。具体来说，我们检查了直觉-统计学家计划中的两条研究方向（贝叶斯推理和复合事件的判断）和启发式和偏差计划中的两条研究方向（框架、锚定和调整）。我们得出结论，以学习为代价关注描述已经深刻地塑造了人类认知易错性的有影响力的观点。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2021 APA，保留所有权利）。