Tower crane is one of the most widely used equipment on the construction sites, but followed by a high accident rate. How to prevent the tower crane operation accident has already been an urgent mission. Although researchers carried out a number of studies about accident causes analysis, monitoring technology and structural mechanics analysis, one of the important gaps is that crane stakeholders and supervision bodies, as the components of a holistic crane safety system, were neglected, resulting in that the prevention of tower crane accidents is seldom solved fundamentally. To bridge these gaps, this paper takes the main stakeholders involved in the tower crane operation, namely, the tower crane users (TCU), the responsible party for repair (RPR) and the responsible party for supervisor (RPS), as research objects. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established. The accident risk perception of each stakeholder is considered in the proposed model and an accident preference coefficient is used to express the important factor. The evolution laws of safety strategy selection of the stakeholders are revealed by solving the proposed model. The numerical simulation is applied to verify the rationality of the solution results of the model. The results find that when the sum of penalty amount and safety reward performance is greater than the safety input cost, RPS, RPR and TCU will adopt the favorable safety supervision strategies of tower crane operation; the accident risk perception of RPR has a greater impact on the evolution and the strategy stability of the three stakeholders.

塔式起重机是建筑工地使用最广泛的设备之一，但其事故率高。如何预防塔机作业事故已经成为当务之急。尽管研究人员在事故原因分析、监测技术和结构力学分析方面进行了大量研究，但一个重要的空白是起重机利益相关者和监管机构作为起重机整体安全系统的组成部分被忽视了，导致塔机事故的预防很少能从根本上解决。为了弥补这些差距，本文以塔机操作的主要利益相关者，即塔机用户（TCU）、维修责任方（RPR）和主管责任方（RPS）为研究对象。建立了三方演化博弈模型。所提出的模型考虑了每个利益相关者的事故风险感知，并使用事故偏好系数来表示重要因素。通过求解所提出的模型，揭示了利益相关者安全策略选择的演化规律。应用数值模拟验证了模型求解结果的合理性。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。所提出的模型考虑了每个利益相关者的事故风险感知，并使用事故偏好系数来表示重要因素。通过求解所提出的模型，揭示了利益相关者安全策略选择的演化规律。应用数值模拟验证了模型求解结果的合理性。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。所提出的模型考虑了每个利益相关者的事故风险感知，并使用事故偏好系数来表示重要因素。通过求解所提出的模型，揭示了利益相关者安全策略选择的演化规律。应用数值模拟验证了模型求解结果的合理性。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。通过求解所提出的模型，揭示了利益相关者安全策略选择的演化规律。应用数值模拟验证了模型求解结果的合理性。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。通过求解所提出的模型，揭示了利益相关者安全策略选择的演化规律。应用数值模拟验证了模型求解结果的合理性。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。结果发现，当处罚金额与安全奖励绩效之和大于安全投入成本时，RPS、RPR和TCU将采取有利的塔机作业安全监管策略；RPR的事故风险感知对三个利益相关者的演化和战略稳定性影响较大。