This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim’s emotional experience is controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them.

本文认为，道德困扰是一种独特的反应态度类别，被视为社会动态的重要组成部分以获得认可。虽然道德困扰并没有证明有不当行为，但它确实在情感上表达了对作为道德提供者的其他人的规范关注的需求。对道德痛苦的道义力量的这种表征的论点建立在两个例子之上，其中受害者的情感体验的认知价值是有争议的：微攻击的情况和错位的痛苦的情况。与痛苦的评估和感知模型相反，有人认为它的认知和规范价值是对话的而不是证据的，