This paper is intended to explore the Rorty’s notion of truth and its vicinity and divergences with Putnam’s notion of truth. Rorty and Putnam, both the philosophers have developed their notion of truth against the traditional representational notion of truth but their strength lies in its distinctive characterization. For Putnam, truth is the property of a statement which cannot be lost but the justification of it could be.

I will also examine the importance of Putnam’s idealized justificatory conditions without which he may succumb to the charge of relativism at the same time how does Putnam overcome the tension between metaphysical and relativistic stances of truth. For Rorty, truth is not representational rather it is social, which means the justification for a true belief is not external but internal to the community of believers. I would further examine how Rorty tries to dispel the charge of relativism which is hard to overcome.

Finally, I shall try to defend the concept of truth which is free from metaphysical baggage and relativistic threats; and in this enterprise Rorty walks half the way and Putnam completes the journey.

本文旨在探讨罗蒂的真理概念及其与普特南真理概念的邻近性和分歧。罗蒂和普特南两位哲学家都发展了他们的真理概念，以反对传统的真理表征概念，但他们的优势在于其独特的表征。对于普特南来说，真理是一个陈述的属性，它不能丢失，但它的正当性可能会丢失。

我还将考察普特南理想化的辩护条件的重要性，否则他可能会屈服于相对主义的指控，同时普特南如何克服形而上学和相对主义真理立场之间的张力。对于罗蒂来说，真理不是表象，而是社会性的，这意味着真正信仰的理由不是外部的，而是信徒社区内部的。我将进一步研究罗蒂如何试图消除难以克服的相对主义指控。

最后，我将努力捍卫没有形而上学包袱和相对主义威胁的真理概念；在这个企业中，Rorty 走了一半的路，Putnam 完成了旅程。