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Countability and self-identity
European Journal for Philosophy of Science ( IF 1.5 ) Pub Date : 2021-11-22 , DOI: 10.1007/s13194-021-00423-z
Adrian Heathcote

The Received View of particles in quantum mechanics is that they are indistinguishable entities within their kinds and that, as a consequence, they are not individuals in the metaphysical sense and self-identity does not meaningfully apply to them. Nevertheless cardinality does apply, in that one can have n> 1 such particles. A number of authors have recently argued that this cluster of claims is internally contradictory: roughly, that having more than one such particle requires that the concepts of distinctness and identity must apply after all. A common thread here is that the notion of identity is too fundamental to forego in any metaphysical account. I argue that this argument fails. I then argue that the failure of individuality and identity applies also to macroscopic physical objects, that the problems cannot be constrained to apply only within the microscopic realm.



中文翻译:

可数性和自我同一性

量子力学中粒子的公认观点是,它们是同类中不可区分的实体,因此,它们不是形而上学意义上的个体,自我同一性对它们没有意义。尽管如此,基数确实适用,因为可以有n> 1 个这样的粒子。许多作者最近争辩说,这组主张在内部是矛盾的:粗略地说,拥有多个这样的粒子需要独特性和同一性的概念毕竟必须适用。这里的一个共同点是,在任何形而上学的叙述中,同一性的概念太基本了,不能放弃。我认为这个论点失败了。然后我争辩说,个性和同一性的失败也适用于宏观物理对象,不能将问题限制为仅适用于微观领域。

更新日期:2021-11-22
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