This book is a worthy successor to those commissioned by the Bank of England that cover its history from its foundation in 1694. It is written by an expert, is thoroughly researched, and provides a wealth of evidence to support the judicious conclusions that are drawn. The discussion ranges from the highly technical to the narrative, indicating the command that Harold James has over his subject. For the period it covers it will become the authorized version of what the Bank of England did and why, covering the details of how it operated as a complex organization and the decisions it made that affected both the domestic and international financial systems. What emerges is how difficult decision making was after the 1970s, following the breakdown of the postwar certainties of the 1950s and 1960s. Though the title suggests that the coverage of the book extends to 2003, it largely ends in 1997. The years that followed are treated with much less depth. That is understandable, as the elephant in the room for any recent history of the Bank of England is the banking crisis of 2007–2008. As it is, the dates chosen are those between which Eddie George, governor of the Bank of England between 1993 and 2003, exerted his greatest influence, having joined in 1962. Increasingly after 1997 Mervyn King took a leading role, becoming deputy governor in 1998 and then governor in 2003. We will have to wait for another commissioned history to discover what part the Bank of England played in the first major banking crisis to hit Britain since that of Overend and Gurney in 1866. Judging from a comment made in this book (p. 432) it is possible that a full understanding of those years will never emerge. When the Monetary Policy Committee, located in the Bank of England, was set up in 1997 it was agreed that the meetings would be recorded and a full transcript of the discussion made. Subsequently, it was decided to delete the recording and destroy the transcript, leaving only the published official record of what took place. This mirrors the Bank of England's destruction of the papers relating to its role in the secondary banking crisis of 1974.

本书是英格兰银行委托的书的继任者，这些书涵盖了自 1694 年成立以来的历史。它由专家撰写，经过深入研究，并提供了丰富的证据来支持所得出的明智结论。讨论范围从高度技术性到叙述性，表明哈罗德詹姆斯对他的主题的控制。在它所涵盖的时期内，它将成为英格兰银行所做的事情和原因的授权版本，涵盖了它作为一个复杂组织如何运作的细节以及它做出的影响国内和国际金融体系的决定。在 1950 年代和 1960 年代战后确定性崩溃之后，出现的是 1970 年代之后的决策是多么困难。尽管书名暗示这本书的覆盖范围可以延伸到 2003 年，但它基本上在 1997 年结束。接下来的几年的深度要少得多。这是可以理解的，因为在英格兰银行的任何近期历史中，最重要的是 2007-2008 年的银行业危机。实际上，所选日期是 1993 年至 2003 年期间英格兰银行行长埃迪·乔治 (Eddie George) 发挥最大影响的日期，他于 1962 年加入。1997 年之后，默文·金越来越多地发挥主导作用，并于 1998 年成为副行长然后是 2003 年的行长。我们将不得不等待另一段委托历史来发现英格兰银行在自 1866 年 Overend 和 Gurney 危机以来袭击英国的第一次重大银行危机中扮演了什么角色。从本书中的评论来看（第 432）有可能永远无法完全了解那些年。当位于英格兰银行的货币政策委员会于 1997 年成立时，会议同意记录会议并制作完整的讨论记录。随后，决定删除录音并销毁笔录，只留下公开的官方记录。这反映了英格兰银行销毁与其在 1974 年二级银行危机中的作用有关的文件。只留下已发表的官方记录。这反映了英格兰银行销毁与其在 1974 年二级银行危机中的作用有关的文件。只留下已发表的官方记录。这反映了英格兰银行销毁与其在 1974 年二级银行危机中的作用有关的文件。