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How regulations undervalue occupational fatalities
Regulation & Governance ( IF 3.203 ) Pub Date : 2021-11-15 , DOI: 10.1111/rego.12445
W. Kip Viscusi 1 , Robert J. Cramer 2
Affiliation  

The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration establishes incentives for safety by setting and enforcing regulatory standards. Using four and a half decades of inspection data, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors underpinning penalties following fatalities. The “fatality premium” for regulatory violations following a worker death is quite modest and is several orders of magnitude below the value-of-a-statistical-life figure needed to establish efficient levels of deterrence in the absence of all other financial incentives. Although there are low statutory caps on penalties, only 8% of the penalties for violations involving fatalities are constrained by the cap, suggesting that current statutes establish norms for reasonable penalty amounts. In situations involving a fatality at firms with union representation during the inspection, the enforcement sanctions are more stringent. Fatalities involving migrant laborers are less heavily penalized.

中文翻译:

法规如何低估职业死亡人数

美国职业安全与健康管理局通过制定和执行监管标准来建立安全激励机制。本文使用四年半的检查数据,全面分析了导致死亡事故后处罚的因素。工人死亡后违反监管规定的“死亡率溢价”非常适中,比在没有所有其他经济激励措施的情况下建立有效威慑水平所需的统计生命值低几个数量级。尽管法定处罚上限较低,但只有 8% 的涉及死亡的违规处罚受上限限制,这表明现行法规确立了合理处罚金额的规范。在检查期间涉及工会代表的公司死亡的情况下,执法制裁更为严厉。涉及移民劳工的死亡事件受到的处罚较轻。
更新日期:2021-11-15
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