This study suggests that conscription produces an unappreciated side effect in domestic politics as it increases the likelihood of coup d’état in anocratic regimes. Utilizing data from 1950 to 2016, the study measures the impact of conscription on coup risk in anocracies and non-anocracies and provides significant evidence that conscription increases the probability of a coup attempt in anocracies. I do not argue that conscripts stage military coups. Instead, conscription increases coup risk in anocracies because it increases the ties of the armed forces with society and enables the general public or interest groups to organize their collective action within the armed forces. This academic endeavor aims to expand our understanding on the impact of the armed forces on the prospects of military intervention, delineate the socialization aspect of conscription, and to broaden our knowledge on civil–military relations in non-democratic regimes.

这项研究表明，征兵在国内政治中产生了一种未被重视的副作用，因为它增加了无政府政权政变的可能性。该研究利用 1950 年至 2016 年的数据，衡量了征兵对政变和非政变中政变风险的影响，并提供了重要的证据，证明征兵增加了政变未遂政变的可能性。我不认为应征入伍者发动军事政变。相反，征兵增加了政变中的政变风险，因为它增加了武装部队与社会的联系，并使公众或利益集团能够在武装部队内组织集体行动。这项学术努力旨在扩大我们对武装部队对军事干预前景的影响的理解，