ABSTRACT

It is a piece of common sense that we can be mean-spirited, cruel, and unfair in the ways that we form beliefs. That is, we can wrong others through our doxastic activity. This fact shows that, contrary to an increasingly widespread view in the ethics of belief literature, morality has a role to play in guiding doxastic deliberation, and evidence is therefore not the only ‘right kind of reason’ for belief. But the mere existence of doxastic wronging does not tell us anything about how, exactly, morality enters into doxastic deliberation. These two lessons are crucial for getting debates in the ethics of belief back on the right track.

中文翻译：

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信念错误和证据主义

摘要

我们在形成信念的方式上可能心胸狭窄、残忍和不公平，这是常识。也就是说，我们可以通过我们的信念活动来误导他人。这一事实表明，与信仰伦理文学中日益广泛的观点相反，道德在指导坚定的审议中发挥作用，因此证据并不是信仰的唯一“正确的理由”。但是仅仅存在信念错误并没有告诉我们道德究竟是如何进入信念深思熟虑的。这两个教训对于让关于信仰伦理的辩论重回正轨至关重要。