A new strategy in philosophy of law appeals to explanatory gap arguments to attack legal positivism. We argue that the strategy faces a dilemma, which derives from two available readings of the constraint it places on legal grounding. To this end, we elaborate the most promising ways of spelling out the epistemic constraints governing law-determination and show that each of the arguments based on them has problems. Throughout the paper, we evaluate a number of explanatory requirements, ultimately with a view to shedding light on the explanatory nature of both grounding in general and legal grounding in particular.

中文翻译：

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法律扎根的解释性诉求

法哲学中的一种新策略诉诸解释性差距论证来攻击法律实证主义。我们认为该策略面临两难境地，这源于对其在法律基础上施加的限制的两种可用解读。为此，我们详细阐述了最有希望的方法来阐明支配法律确定的认知约束，并表明基于它们的每个论点都有问题。在整篇论文中，我们评估了许多解释性要求，最终目的是阐明一般接地和特定法律接地的解释性质。