Intentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: reasonable and rational persons can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.

中文翻译：

---

客观意向主义和分歧

法律解释的意向主义理论通常分为客观主义和主观主义两种变体。前者根据合理/理性的立法者的意图或合理/理性的观众认为他们的意图来做出正确的解释。后者在解释是说话者实际意图的情况下认为解释是正确的。本文认为，客观主义面临着严重的问题，因为它无法处理分歧：理性和理性的人通常会在文本的解释应该是什么方面存在分歧。它还捍卫主观主义免受客观主义者的批评。