In the Nash demand game (NDG) n players announce utility demands, the demands are implemented if they are jointly feasible, and otherwise no one gets anything. If the utilities set is the simplex, the game is called “divide-the-dollar”. Brams and Taylor (Theory Decis 37:211–231, 1994) studied variants of divide-the-dollar, on which they imposed reasonableness conditions. I explore the implications of these conditions on general NDGs. In any reasonable NDG, the egalitarian demand profile cannot be obtained via iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Further, a reasonable NDG may fail to have a Nash equilibrium, even in mixed strategies. In the 2-person case, existence of pure strategy equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a value, in the sense that each player can secure the egalitarian payoff level independent of his opponent’s play. This result does not extend to reasonable NDGs with more than two players. Interestingly, there are results for reasonable NDGs that hold for two and three players, but not for \(n\ge 4\) players.

在纳什游戏点播（NDG）ñ参与者宣布效用需求，如果这些需求共同可行，则实施这些需求，否则没有人得到任何东西。如果公用事业集是单纯形，则该游戏称为“瓜分美元”。Brams 和 Taylor (Theory Decis 37:211–231, 1994) 研究了分摊美元的变体，他们在这些变体上施加了合理性条件。我探讨了这些条件对一般 NDG 的影响。在任何合理的 NDG 中，都不能通过迭代消除弱支配策略来获得平等主义的需求概况。此外，即使在混合策略中，合理的 NDG 也可能无法达到纳什均衡。在 2 人的情况下，纯策略均衡的存在等价于价值的存在，在这种意义上，每个参与者都可以独立于对手的游戏而获得平等的收益水平。这个结果不会扩展到具有两个以上参与者的合理 NDG。有趣的是，对于合理的 NDG 有结果适用于两个和三个玩家，但不适用于\(n\ge 4\) 个玩家。