Formal models of war termination have been developed along two major approaches: in one, war is interpreted as a series of battles, where nations exchange denials that aim to destroy enemy forces; in the other, war is illustrated as a process of bargaining with mutual punishments that inflict costs on opponents. By integrating these two approaches, I build a dynamic model of war, where two nations choose between military force and civilian value as the targets of their attacks in every battle. The war proceeds along one of the following three paths in equilibrium. First, either nation immediately gives in to the other’s threat of punishment such as nuclear strikes. Second, both the nations continue to conduct counterforce denial campaigns to weaken each other until either side is fully disarmed (i.e. all-out war). Third, after significant military imbalance is generated by the exchange of denials in an early battle, the winner of the battle switches to a countervalue punishment campaign, to which the loser responds by capitulation (i.e. limited war). My equilibrium analyses suggest that while denials largely determine a war’s outcome, punishments can influence its duration. Unlike existing models, mine illuminates the two-way causal relationship, where past battle outcomes can influence the choice of military strategy, whereas military strategies also shape how the war will further evolve.

战争终止的正式模型是沿着两种主要方法发展起来的：第一，战争被解释为一系列战斗，在这些战斗中，各国相互否认以摧毁敌军；另一方面，战争被描述为一个讨价还价的过程，相互惩罚给对手带来代价。通过整合这两种方法，我构建了一个动态的战争模型，其中两个国家在每次战斗中选择军事力量和平民价值作为攻击目标。战争沿着以下三种平衡路径之一进行。首先，任何一个国家都会立即屈服于对方的惩罚威胁，例如核打击。其次，两国继续进行反击否认运动以削弱对方，直到任何一方完全解除武装（即全面战争）。第三，在早期战斗中因交换否认而产生显着的军事失衡后，战斗的胜利者转向反价值惩罚运动，失败者以投降（即有限战争）作为回应。我的均衡分析表明，虽然否认在很大程度上决定了战争的结果，但惩罚会影响战争的持续时间。与现有模型不同，我的模型阐明了双向因果关系，其中过去的战斗结果会影响军事战略的选择，而军事战略也会影响战争的进一步发展。我的均衡分析表明，虽然否认在很大程度上决定了战争的结果，但惩罚会影响战争的持续时间。与现有模型不同，我的模型阐明了双向因果关系，其中过去的战斗结果会影响军事战略的选择，而军事战略也会影响战争的进一步发展。我的均衡分析表明，虽然否认在很大程度上决定了战争的结果，但惩罚会影响战争的持续时间。与现有模型不同，我的模型阐明了双向因果关系，其中过去的战斗结果会影响军事战略的选择，而军事战略也会影响战争的进一步发展。