Jouissance refers to an excess enjoyment beyond (yet tied to) speech and representation. From the perspective of some Lacanian analysts, jouissance is precisely what testifies against any relationship to the brain—jouissance “slips” out of cognition. On the contrary, it is argued here that jouissance has a central place in contemporary neuropsychoanalysis. In part 1 of this series the metapsychology of jouissance was presented in relation to the real and symbolic registers. Here, in part 2, Mark Solms’s neuropsychoanalytic model of Karl Friston’s free energy principle is summarized. In this model, “predictions” aim to resolve prediction errors—most notably, those signaled by affective consciousness. “Surplus prediction error”—prediction error that arises at the point where the predictive model fails—is proposed to be a neural correlate of jouissance. This limit within prediction is analogous to the real as a structural negativity within the symbolic.

Jouissance是指超出（但与）言论和表现相联系的过度享受。从一些拉康派分析家的角度来看，享乐恰恰证明了与大脑的任何关系都相反——享乐从认知中“溜走”。相反，这里认为享乐在当代神经精神分析中占有核心地位。在本系列的第 1 部分中，享乐的元心理学与真实和符号寄存器相关。在此，第 2 部分总结了 Mark Solms 的 Karl Friston 自由能原理的神经精神分析模型。在这个模型中，“预测”旨在解决预测错误——最显着的是那些由情感意识发出的信号。“剩余预测误差”——在预测模型失败时出现的预测误差——被认为是享乐的神经相关性。预测中的这种限制类似于作为符号中的结构否定性的真实。