Under Canadian constitutional law, state neutrality acts as an implicit organizing principle for the relations between the state and religions. Neutrality, however, is a polysemic word: conceptions of neutrality vary. Competing versions of neutrality feature in the decisions of Canadian courts. This is starkly evident in decisions that originate from Quebec, where judges have harboured divergent views of neutrality on matters such as the reciting of prayers in town hall meetings or the teaching of religious diversity in schools. This article analyses how the Canadian Supreme Court has manoeuvred through competing conceptions of state religious neutrality. Initially divided, the Court seems to have eventually opted for a type of neutrality that allows the state to recognize the existence of religions in laws and policies, but that also prevents it from indoctrination and from arbitrating between competing viewpoints within religions. This view of neutrality, I argue, is consistent with the principle of multiculturalism and with the Court’s characterization of a ‘free and democratic society’, as this notion is understood in Canada.

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理解一个复杂的概念：关于加拿大国家宗教中立性的辩论——来自魁北克的观点

根据加拿大宪法，国家中立是国家与宗教之间关系的隐含组织原则。然而，中立是一个多义词：中立的概念各不相同。加拿大法院的裁决中存在竞争版本的中立性。这在源自魁北克的决定中非常明显，那里的法官在市政厅会议上背诵祈祷文或在学校教授宗教多样性等问题上对中立持不同看法。本文分析了加拿大最高法院如何通过相互竞争的国家宗教中立概念进行操作。最初分裂的法院似乎最终选择了一种中立性，允许国家在法律和政策中承认宗教的存在，但这也阻止了它的灌输和在宗教内部相互竞争的观点之间进行仲裁。我认为，这种中立观点与多元文化主义原则以及法院对“自由民主社会”的描述是一致的，正如加拿大对这一概念的理解一样。