Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related? Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement? Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths? This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life.

规范性概念是胡塞尔对意向性解释的核心：意图一个对象是一种规范性成就，本质上承认满足或失望。目的论也是如此：有意有意识的生活与“康德意义上的观念”的水平取向密不可分。它们有什么关系？目的论对于作为规范性成就的意向性来说是必不可少的吗？或者，按照胡塞尔的说法，相对真理是否“要求”理想真理？本文探讨了同意胡塞尔确实如此的一些理由。在秒。2，我将在胡塞尔关于知觉意向性基本结构的说明中确定一个“规范转向”，并阐明这个规范说明的目的论特征。这种目的论意义是最低限度的。更强大的目的论，在朝向无限理想的方向的意义上，然后在第二节中得到证明。3 凭借其在构成真正客观性中的作用。在秒。4、我将转向理性的，尤其是胡塞尔分析中以自我为导向的一面，以阐明无限目的的规范力量。总而言之，我将论证，在胡塞尔对有意识的有意识生活的描述中，故事的规范和目的论方面是密不可分的。