This article critiques the Indian jurisprudence on section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Under the present legal framework, a confession of a co-defendant in a joint criminal trial may be utilized by the Courts to corroborate other pieces of evidence, in order to determine the guilt of non-confessing defendants, also. However, this article argues that the ‘original meaning’ of section 30 makes the confession of a testifying defendant, admissible as against its maker—alone. And not against the other co-defendants. This position is supported by the drafting history behind section 30, and further, is the tradition and practice across common law jurisdictions. In this connection, the author argues that in the absence of any cross-examination or oath, admitting such a confession under section 30 prejudices the fair trial right of non-confessing co-defendants. Hence, it must be excluded altogether by the Courts—as a bright-line rule—while the guilt of those non-confessing co-defendants is determined. Conversely, the author argues that the interpretation of section 30 in light of its original meaning, which makes confession admissible against its maker alone, would automatically safeguard constitutional due process guarantees and the fair trial right of the non-confessing defendants.

中文翻译：

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穿越浑水——印度证据法下共同被告供述的合法性、有效性和可靠性

本文针对 1872 年《印度证据法》第 30 条对印度判例进行了批评。在目前的法律框架下，法院可以利用共同被告人在联合刑事审判中的供词来证实其他证据，以便确定未认罪的被告的罪行，也。然而，本文认为 ' 的本意’第 30 条规定作证被告的供词可作为针对其制造者的单独供词予以受理。而不是针对其他共同被告。这一立场得到了第 30 条背后的起草历史的支持，此外，这也是普通法司法管辖区的传统和惯例。在这方面，提交人辩称，在没有任何盘问或宣誓的情况下，根据第 30 条承认此类供词损害了不供认罪的共同被告的公平审判权。因此，法院必须将其完全排除——作为一条明确的规则——同时确定那些不认罪的共同被告有罪。相反，提交人争辩说，根据第 30 条的原意解释，这使得仅针对其制造者的供述是可以接受的，