This paper will compare and contrast Visegrád and Southeast European mobility towards (and away from) the European Union (EU) ideal of cohesion, in the process investigating conflicting “core” and “peripheral” assertions of “Europeanness.” Though the Visegrád states have exceeded economic expectations, they have to varying degrees stood in opposition to the values of the EU’s self-professed “European identity,” with Hungary and Poland in particular demonstrating increasing illiberalism. Meanwhile, in Southeast Europe, lacklustre economic performance has tended to contrast with increasingly liberal democratic rule and strong popular support for the EU “project.” The EU’s cohesion strategy has prioritized economic convergence and, ultimately, this has meant that budgetary considerations, and political rhetoric and scrutiny, have often favoured the rebellious but economically resurgent Visegrád states over the weaker economies of a more compliant Southeast Europe. The EU’s integration strategy of constructing “identity hegemony” depends upon both economic and socio-political convergence. This paper questions the congruence of these focuses, given the discriminatory application of integration incentives and the persistence of Orientalism/Balkanism in West European rhetoric.

本文将比较和对比维谢格拉德和东南欧的流动性朝着（和远离）欧盟 (EU) 的凝聚力理想，在调查“欧洲性”的相互冲突的“核心”和“外围”断言的过程中。尽管维谢格拉德国家的经济超出预期，但它们在不同程度上反对欧盟自称“欧洲认同”的价值观，尤其是匈牙利和波兰表现出日益严重的不自由主义。与此同时，在东南欧，低迷的经济表现往往与日益自由的民主统治和民众对欧盟“项目”的强烈支持形成鲜明对比。欧盟的凝聚战略优先考虑经济融合，最终，这意味着预算考虑、政治言论和审查，与更加顺从的东南欧的较弱经济体相比，他们经常偏爱叛逆但经济复苏的维谢格拉德国家。欧盟构建“身份霸权”的一体化战略取决于经济和社会政治的融合。鉴于一体化激励的歧视性应用以及西欧修辞中东方主义/巴尔干主义的持续存在，本文质疑这些焦点的一致性。