The thesis that law necessarily claims authority is popular amongst legal philosophers. Some distinguished legal philosophers, including the late John Gardner, Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro, have suggested that support for this thesis is found in legal officials’ use of deontic language. This article begins by considering the merits of this suggestion. I discuss two unpromising arguments for the claim thesis based on the use of deontic language in law. I then suggest that a more plausible basis for the claim thesis lies in the felicity conditions of the speech acts that legal officials perform. In the absence of an explicit claim to authority, legal officials make a presupposition to authority over their subjects. The presupposition arises from interaction between the felicity conditions of legal speech acts and basic norms of cooperative communication. I consider some implications of this conclusion for our understanding of legal authority.

中文翻译：

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预设法律权威

法律必然要求权威的论点在法律哲学家中很流行。一些杰出的法律哲学家，包括已故的约翰·加德纳、约瑟夫·拉兹和斯科特·夏皮罗，认为法律官员使用道义语言可以支持这一论点。本文首先考虑该建议的优点。我讨论了基于在法律中使用道义语言的主张论点的两个没有希望的论点。然后我建议，主张论点的一个更合理的基础在于法律官员执行的言论行为的幸福条件。在没有明确的权威要求的情况下，法律官员对他们的臣民做出了权威的预设。这一预设源于法律言论行为的幸福条件与合作交流的基本规范之间的相互作用。我考虑了这个结论对我们理解法律权威的一些影响。