This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.

中文翻译：

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欧盟准监管国家的问责制：经济和货币联盟的案例

本文参照欧盟 (EU) 经济和货币联盟，重新审视 Majone 关于监管国家问责制的著名论点。我们表明，欧盟已进入“准监管国家”阶段，其标志是欧盟在与核心国家权力相关的领域加强监管。尽管这些政策领域具有再分配和政治化的性质，但欧盟的“准监管国家”继续依赖其问责制监管模式，侧重于决策过程和利益调解。与 Majone 一致，我们将该模型描述为程序性的，并将其与实质性问责制进行对比——当监管具有明确的再分配含义时，这是必要的。使用财政政策和货币事务的两个案例研究，我们说明了欧洲议会和欧盟法院行使的程序问责制的主导地位。我们通过关于如何在这两个领域潜在地提出实质性问责制的规范性讨论来补充实证分析。