Abstract

Uriah Kriegel has attempted to describe the varieties of consciousness, that is, the primitive elements that constitute the phenomenal realm. Perceptual, imaginative, algedonic, cognitive, entertaining, and conative are the types of phenomenology acknowledged by him. This list, though right, is incomplete. My main claim is that for it to be complete it should include sui generis emotional phenomenology. To motivate that thesis, I will highlight the characteristic normativity of emotional phenomenology and contrast it with the characteristic normativity of Kriegel’s phenomenal elements. I will conceive, by means of a mental experiment in the form of a phenomenal contrast, a felt normative clash between emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s primitive phenomenal states. The idea behind it is that the felt normative clash is possible because emotional phenomenology and Kriegel’s phenomenal elements are metaphysically distinct.

摘要

Uriah Kriegel 试图描述意识的多样性，即构成现象领域的原始元素。感性的、想像的、痛觉的、认知的、娱乐的和意动的是他所承认的现象学类型。这份清单虽然正确，但并不完整。我的主要主张是，为了使其完整，它应该包括自成一格情绪现象学。为了激发该论文的动机，我将强调情绪现象学的特征规范性，并将其与 Kriegel 的现象元素的特征规范性进行对比。我将通过现象对比形式的心理实验，设想情感现象学与克里格尔原始现象状态之间的规范冲突。其背后的想法是，感觉到的规范冲突是可能的，因为情感现象学和克里格尔的现象元素在形而上学上是不同的。