Abstract

The positivists defined analyticity as truth in virtue of meaning alone and advocated the view that the notion of analyticity so defined is co-extensive with both the notion of an a priori truth and that of a necessary truth. For a number of reasons, this notion of analyticity is nowadays held to be untenable, and the related doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths are almost unanimously rejected. Against this consensus, I will argue that, if correctly understood, the positivists’ version of the analytic/synthetic distinction is defensible. Moreover, I will propose partial and somewhat qualified defences of their linguistic doctrines about a priori truths and necessary truths.

摘要

实证主义者仅凭借意义就将分析性定义为真理，并主张这样定义的分析性概念与先验真理和必然真理的概念是共同扩展的。由于多种原因，这种分析性的概念如今被认为是站不住脚的，关于先验真理和必然真理的相关学说几乎被一致拒绝。反对这种共识，我将争辩说，如果正确理解，实证主义者版本的分析/综合区分是有道理的。此外，我将针对他们关于先验真理和必然真理的语言学说提出部分的和有些限定的辩护。