The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christopher Devlin Brown (“Making room for a this-worldly physicalism,” Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523–32).

中文翻译：

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对物理主义的附带要求的辩护

对物理主义的附带性要求粗略地说，如果物理主义是真的，那么心理属性会附加在基本的物理属性上。在解释了要求的基础之后，我针对雷忠（“Physicalism without supervenience”，Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529-44）、Barbara Gail Montero（“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental关于物理？” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93-110)，以及 Montero 和 Christopher Devlin Brown（“为世俗的物理主义腾出空间”，Topoi 37 (3), 2018: 523-32）。