ABSTRACT

Stationary banditry is ubiquitous in civil war, with some rebel groups even investing in and profiting from primary commodities for years or decades. But for many of these groups, labor is a necessary component of resource production, such that laborers’ economic participation is vital for rebel funding and survival. States, meanwhile, are eager to prevent rebels from establishing these economic footholds. In areas where rebels can assert control of primary commodity markets, military competition between states and rebels may be supplemented by economic competition over laborers’ efforts. Under what conditions do governments wage local economic war by providing incentives to laborers to minimize the appeal of economically partnering with rebels? I argue that laborers’ economic loyalty is a central and under-considered component to resource-driven conflicts. When rebels seek to establish stationary banditry, states incentivize laborers to participate in the legal economy rather than rebel-controlled markets. Specifically, states will pursue economic counterinsurgency policies in areas where rebels are most likely to profit from labor-intensive primary commodities. I find support for this argument using municipal-level Colombian data about the FARC’s involvement in the coca trade and government provision of agricultural credits.

摘要

固定土匪在内战中无处不在，一些反叛团体甚至投资初级商品并从中获利数年或数十年。但对于这些群体中的许多人来说，劳动力是资源生产的必要组成部分，因此劳动力的经济参与对于叛军的资金和生存至关重要。与此同时，各国急于阻止叛乱分子建立这些经济据点。在叛军可以控制初级商品市场的地区，国家和叛军之间的军事竞争可能会通过对劳动者努力的经济竞争来补充。政府在什么条件下通过激励劳动者来发动地方经济战争，以尽量减少与叛乱分子在经济上合作的吸引力？我认为，劳动者的经济忠诚度是资源驱动型冲突的核心和未充分考虑的组成部分。当叛军寻求建立固定的土匪活动时，国家会鼓励劳工参与合法经济，而不是叛军控制的市场。具体而言，各州将在叛军最有可能从劳动密集型初级商品中获利的地区推行经济平叛政策。我使用哥伦比亚市级关于 FARC 参与古柯贸易和政府提供农业信贷的数据来支持这一论点。国家鼓励劳动者参与合法经济，而不是叛军控制的市场。具体而言，各州将在叛军最有可能从劳动密集型初级商品中获利的地区推行经济平叛政策。我使用哥伦比亚市级关于 FARC 参与古柯贸易和政府提供农业信贷的数据来支持这一论点。国家鼓励劳动者参与合法经济，而不是叛军控制的市场。具体而言，各州将在叛军最有可能从劳动密集型初级商品中获利的地区推行经济平叛政策。我使用哥伦比亚市级关于 FARC 参与古柯贸易和政府提供农业信贷的数据来支持这一论点。