This paper examines the relationship between US aid and human rights violations in autocracies. It argues that autocratic leaders do not want to lose aid owing to their poor human rights records, and yet at the same time, cannot completely stop their rights violations because they often come into power through force. In this situation, the leader acts strategically by substituting the visible rights violations for invisible ones. However, substitution depends on the strategic relationship between the US and the recipient. If the recipient is strategically unimportant, then we can expect substitution; otherwise, it will not be necessary.

中文翻译：

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美国援助和替代侵犯人权行为

本文考察了美国援助与专制国家侵犯人权之间的关系。它认为，专制领导人不想因其糟糕的人权记录而失去援助，但同时也无法完全停止侵犯他们的权利，因为他们往往是通过武力上台的。在这种情况下，领导者通过将可见的权利侵犯替换为不可见的侵犯来采取战略行动。然而，替代取决于美国与接受国之间的战略关系。如果接收方在战略上不重要，那么我们可以期待替代；否则，就没有必要了。