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Deterrence and the Adjustment of Sentences During Imprisonment
American Law and Economics Review ( IF 0.960 ) Pub Date : 2021-10-04 , DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahab004
A Mitchell Polinsky 1 , Steven Shavell 2
Affiliation  

The prison time actually served by a convicted criminal depends to a significant degree on decisions made by the state during the course of imprisonment—notably, on whether to grant parole. We study a model of the adjustment of sentences assuming that the state’s objective is the optimal deterrence of crime. In the model, the state can lower or raise a criminal’s initial sentence on the basis of deterrence-relevant information obtained during imprisonment. Our focus on sentence adjustment as a means of promoting deterrence stands in contrast to the usual emphasis in sentence adjustment policy on avoiding recidivism.

中文翻译:

服刑期间的威慑与量刑调整

被定罪的罪犯实际服刑的时间在很大程度上取决于国家在监禁过程中做出的决定——尤其是是否准予假释。我们假设国家的目标是对犯罪的最佳威慑,研究了一个句子调整的模型。在该模型中,国家可以根据监禁期间获得的威慑相关信息来降低或提高罪犯的初始刑期。我们将判决调整作为促进威慑的一种手段,这与判决调整政策通常强调避免累犯形成鲜明对比。
更新日期:2021-10-04
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