In order to reply to the contemporary skeptic’s argument for the conclusion that we don’t have any empirical knowledge about the external world, several authors have proposed different fallibilist theories of knowledge that reject the epistemic closure principle. Holliday (Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44(1), 1–62 2015a), however, shows that almost all of them suffer from either the problem of containment or the problem of vacuous knowledge or both. Furthermore, Holliday (2015b) suggests that the fallibilist should allow a proposition to have multiple sets of relevant alternatives, each of which is sufficient while none is necessary, if all its members are eliminated, for knowing that proposition. Not completely satisfied with Holliday’s multi-path reply to the skeptic, the author suggests a new single-path relevant-possibility theory of knowledge and argues that it can avoid both the problem of containment and the problem of vacuous knowledge of a certain sort while rejecting skepticism about the external world.

为了回应当代怀疑论者关于我们对外部世界没有任何经验知识的结论的论点，几位作者提出了不同的可谬论知识理论，拒绝认知封闭原则。霍利迪（哲学逻辑杂志，44(1), 1–62 2015a) 然而，表明几乎所有人都面临着遏制问题或空洞知识的问题，或两者兼而有之。此外，Holliday (2015b) 建议易错论者应该允许一个命题有多个相关的替代方案，每一个都是足够的，而没有必要，如果它的所有成员都被淘汰了，那么知道这个命题。作者对霍利迪对怀疑论者的多路径回复并不完全满意，提出了一种新的单路径相关可能性知识理论，认为它既可以避免遏制问题，也可以避免某种知识的空洞问题，同时拒绝对外部世界的怀疑。