We provide a description of ownership patterns in the top 25 European banks for the period 2003–2015, where we especially focus on the global financial crisis. Investment managers, such as Blackrock, are dominant in terms of number of blockholdings in different banks, maintaining fairly stable “common ownership” networks throughout our sample. However, the financial crisis led to capital injections by governments in several banks in trouble, which in turn led to a jump in holdings by governments, which typically are “non-common owners” (i.e., they hold only shares in only one bank). This jump translated into these investors temporarily being the top investor with a large share, and non-common owners being the majority among large shareholders. A brief comparison with US banks uncovers large ownership differences between the European and US banking sectors. We briefly discuss what these ownership patterns might imply for competition, stability and performance in the banking industry.

中文翻译：

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欧洲银行业的共同所有制模式——金融危机的影响1

我们描述了 2003-2015 年期间欧洲前 25 家银行的所有权模式，我们特别关注全球金融危机。贝莱德等投资管理公司在不同银行的大宗持股数量方面占主导地位，在我们的样本中保持着相当稳定的“共同所有权”网络。然而，金融危机导致政府向几家陷入困境的银行注资，这反过来又导致政府增持，这些政府通常是“非共同所有者”（即他们只持有一家银行的股份） . 这种跳跃转化为这些投资者暂时成为拥有大量股份的最大投资者，而非普通所有者成为大股东中的多数。与美国银行的简要比较揭示了欧洲和美国银行业之间的巨大所有权差异。我们简要讨论了这些所有权模式对银行业的竞争、稳定性和绩效可能意味着什么。