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Advance voting and political competition
Constitutional Political Economy Pub Date : 2021-10-07 , DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09351-9
Mats Ekman 1
Affiliation  

This paper appears to be the first to analyse political campaign incentives when the electorate vote at different moments before Election Day, a phenomenon known as early or advance voting. Many jurisdictions accommodate such voting by accepting mail-in ballots or by opening polling places before Election Day. Since politicians can thereby add campaign promises while citizens vote, they have an incentive to add promises valued by late-voting segments as Election Day approaches. This implies that early-voting segments of the electorate will pay higher taxes and receive lower transfers than had been announced when they voted. Late-voting segments benefit.



中文翻译:

提前投票和政治竞争

这篇论文似乎是第一个分析选民在选举日前不同时刻投票时的政治竞选动机,这种现象被称为提前投票或提前投票。许多司法管辖区通过接受邮寄选票或在选举日之前开设投票站来适应这种投票。由于政治家因此可以公民投票时添加竞选承诺,因此随着选举日的临近,他们有动力添加受晚投票部分重视的承诺。这意味着选民中提前投票的部分将支付比他们投票时宣布的更高的税和更少的转移。晚投票部分受益。

更新日期:2021-10-08
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