This paper proposes a novel answer to the question of what attitude agents should adopt when they receive misleading higher-order evidence that avoids the drawbacks of existing views. The answer builds on the independently motivated observation that there is a difference between attitudes that agents form as conclusions of their reasoning, called terminal attitudes, and attitudes that are formed in a transitional manner in the process of reasoning, called transitional attitudes. Terminal and transitional attitudes differ both in their descriptive and in their normative properties. When an agent receives higher-order evidence that they might have reasoned incorrectly to a belief or credence towards p, then their attitude towards p is no longer justified as a terminal attitude towards p, but it can still be justified as a transitional attitude. This view, which I call the unmooring view, allows us to capture the rational impact of misleading higher-order evidence in a way that integrates smoothly with a natural picture of epistemic justification and the dynamics of deliberation.

中文翻译：

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过渡性态度和高阶证据的非系泊观点

本文针对代理人在收到误导性高阶证据时应采取何种态度的问题提出了一个新颖的答案，避免了现有观点的弊端。答案建立在独立动机的观察之上，即主体作为其推理结论形成的态度（称为最终态度）与在推理过程中以过渡方式形成的态度（称为过渡态度）之间存在差异。最终态度和过渡态度在描述性和规范性方面都有所不同。当代理人收到更高阶的证据表明他们可能错误地推理出对p 的信念或信任时，那么他们对p 的态度不再被证明是对p 的最终态度，但它仍然可以被证明是一种过渡态度。这种观点，我称之为unmooring 观点，使我们能够以一种与认知论证的自然图景和深思熟虑的动态顺利结合的方式，捕捉误导性高阶证据的理性影响。