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Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election: Evidence from Italian Municipalities
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization ( IF 1.324 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-14 , DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewaa024
Giorgio Gulino 1
Affiliation  

Abstract
Using micro-level data on local Italian elections and exploiting a discontinuity at a population cutoff, I study the effect of electoral systems on politician selection and re-election. Evidence shows that the mayor’s probability of re-election is 25 percentage points higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems. Ruling coalitions elected under the majoritarian system enjoy a stable and long-lasting majority, attract more central transfers, and invest more in public libraries. While mayors elected under the two different electoral systems do not differ in any observable characteristics, they do tend to embark on a different political careers once they lose their municipal office. Surprisingly, mayors elected under the proportional system have a higher probability of being elected to regional offices after their mandate. (JEL D72, H70, P16)


中文翻译:

选举制度、选举和连任:来自意大利市政当局的证据

摘要
使用意大利地方选举的微观数据并利用人口截止时的不连续性,我研究了选举制度对政治家选择和连任的影响。有证据表明,多数制的市长连任概率比比例制高 25 个百分点。在牧马制度下选出的统治联盟享有稳定和持久的多数,吸引更多的中央转移,并在公共图书馆投资更多。While mayors elected under the two different electoral systems do not differ in any observable characteristics, they do tend to embark on a different political careers once they lose their municipal office. Surprisingly, mayors elected under the proportional system have a higher probability of being elected to regional offices after their mandate. (JEL D72、H70、P16)
更新日期:2020-12-14
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