This article seeks to introduce a greater degree of precision into our understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist ontological non-foundationalism, focussing specifically on the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE). It distinguishes four senses of what the ‘foundation’ whose existence Mādhyamikas deny means; that is, (1) as ‘something that stands under or grounds things’ (a position known as generic substantialism); (2) as ‘a particular kind of basic entity’ (specific substantialism); (3) as ‘an individual essence (a haecceity or thisness of that object) by means of which it is identical to that very object, to itself’ (modal essentialism); and (4) as ‘an essence in the absence of which an object could be of a radically different kind or sort of object than it in fact is’ (sortal essentialism). It then proceeds to delineate the Madhyamaka refutation of the specific substantialist position in terms of its argued denial of dharma as basic entity; of generic substantialism and modal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of svabhāva as both foundation for and essence of putative entities; and of sortal essentialism in terms of its argued denial of essentialist conceptions of conceptual thought (vikalpa), mental construction (prapañca), and in short the entire domain of ratiocination (kalpanā), by means of its notion of conceptual imputation (prajñaptir upādāya)—a denial strictly speaking ontological, but of what are putative epistemic entities. The final portion of the article explains the relationship of ontological to other forms of non-foundationalism according to Madhyamaka.

本文旨在更准确地理解我们对中观佛教本体论非基础主义的理解，特别关注中观创始人龙树菩萨（公元 150-250 年）。它区分了中观否认存在的“基础”的四种含义；也就是说，（1）作为“存在于事物之下或作为事物基础的事物”（一种被称为一般实体主义的立场）；（2）作为“一种特殊的基本实体”（特定实体主义）；(3) 作为“个体本质（haecceity  or  thisness那个对象的），通过它它与那个对象本身相同”（模态本质主义）；(4) 作为“一种本质，如果没有它，一个对象可能是一种与它实际上完全不同的种类或种类的对象”（分类本质主义）。然后，它继续描绘中观对具体实体主义立场的驳斥，其论据是否认佛法作为基本实体；普遍实体主义和模态本质主义的论据，即否认svabhāva作为假定实体的基础和本质；和分类本质主义的论点否认本质主义概念思想（vikalpa），心理建设（prapañca）），简而言之，整个推理领域（kalpanā），通过其概念归责（prajñaptir upādāya）的概念——严格地说是本体论的否认，但否认了推定的认识实体。根据中观，文章的最后部分解释了本体论与其他形式的非基础论之间的关系。