Talk about social or distributive justice, at least among legal and political philosophers, tends to focus heavily on institutions. This way of thinking about justice owes a great deal to John Rawls. Rawls’s theory of justice was famously criticised by Robert Nozick, who in turn attracted an influential critique from G. A. Cohen. The story of these critiques is well known, but this article tells it in an unfamiliar way. The common theme in Nozick’s and Cohen’s arguments, I contend, is that there is a way of thinking about social justice that focuses not primarily on institutions, but rather on interpersonal relationships. I call this idea small justice. Justice, on this view, is identified with whatever institutions would arise through a process of social evolution from ethical interpersonal dealings repeated consistently over time.

中文翻译：

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小正义理念

至少在法律和政治哲学家之间，谈论社会或分配正义往往主要集中在制度上。这种思考正义的方式很大程度上归功于约翰·罗尔斯。罗尔斯的正义理论受到罗伯特·诺齐克的著名批评，后者又引起了 GA Cohen 的有影响力的批评。这些批评的故事众所周知，但这篇文章以一种陌生的方式讲述了它。我认为，诺齐克和科恩的论点的共同主题是，有一种思考社会正义的方式，它主要关注的不是制度，而是人际关系。我称这个想法为小正义. 在这种观点上，正义被等同于任何制度，这些制度会随着时间的推移不断重复的伦理人际交往的社会进化过程而产生。