ABSTRACT

Average utilitarianism and several related axiologies, when paired with the standard expectational theory of decision-making under risk and with reasonable empirical credences, can find their practical prescriptions overwhelmingly determined by the minuscule probability that the agent assigns to solipsism—that is, to the hypothesis that there is only one welfare subject in the world, namely, herself. This either (i) constitutes a reductio of these axiologies, (ii) suggests that they require bespoke decision theories, or (iii) furnishes an unexpected argument for ethical egoism.

中文翻译：

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平均功利主义意味着唯我主义利己主义

摘要

平均功利主义和一些相关的价值论，当与标准的风险决策预期理论和合理的经验证据相结合时，可以发现它们的实际处方绝大多数取决于代理人分配给唯我论的微小概率——即假设世界上只有一个福利主体，那就是她自己。这要么 (i) 构成了这些价值论的归约，(ii) 表明它们需要定制的决策理论，或者 (iii) 为伦理利己主义提供了意想不到的论据。