We examine the effect of CEO inside debt on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and CSR. This positive relation is attenuated not only when firms face high risk, but also when firms have high short-term institutional ownership. Our evidence supports the view that CEOs with large inside debt holdings are more concerned about firm sustainability and, are therefore more likely to prefer CSR for long-term firm benefits, i.e., the long game. We also find that CSR and CEO inside debt jointly exert a significantly positive impact on long-run stock performance, particularly in the presence of a low level of short-term institutional holdings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of aligning institutional investor preferences with CEO incentives in order to maximize shareholder benefits from CSR investment.

我们研究了 CEO 内债对企业社会责任 (CSR) 的影响。我们记录了 CEO 内部债务与企业社会责任之间的正相关关系。这种正相关不仅在企业面临高风险时减弱，而且当企业拥有高短期机构所有权时也会减弱。我们的证据支持这样一种观点，即持有大量内部债务的 CEO 更关心公司的可持续性，因此更有可能为了公司的长期利益（即长期博弈）而更喜欢企业社会责任。我们还发现，CSR 和 CEO 内债共同对股票的长期表现产生显着的积极影响，尤其是在短期机构持股水平较低的情况下。总体，