当前位置: X-MOL 学术Eur. J. Oper. Res. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Should a retailer bargain over a wholesale price with a manufacturer using a dual-channel supply chain?
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.4 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-24 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.09.012
Kenji Matsui 1
Affiliation  

In this paper, we investigate the problem of whether a retailer should bargain over the wholesale price of a product with a manufacturer or accept the price unilaterally determined by the manufacturer. To investigate the problem, we develop a game-theoretic model describing a supply chain organized by one manufacturer and one retailer. Intuitively, if there is a bargaining opportunity, a retailer is better off bargaining over the wholesale price rather than simply accepting the price determined by the manufacturer. Consistent with this intuition, we first show the benchmark outcome that the retailer achieves a higher profit through bargaining over the price when the manufacturer uses only a single-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer sells only through the retailer. Conversely, however, we demonstrate that this intuitive result can be completely reversed in a dual-channel supply chain environment, in which the manufacturer is able to sell products not only through the retailer but also directly to end-consumers. Specifically, we find that if a retailer's bargaining power is sufficiently strong and if consumers' substitutability between channels is substantially high, full acceptance of the wholesale price dictated by the manufacturer earns the retailer a higher profit than bargaining. This counterintuitive result is a warning to retailers in dual-channel environments because if a retailer does not accept the wholesale price dictated by a manufacturer, but heedlessly exploits its strong power and bargains with the manufacturer, it may ultimately harm itself and reduce its own profits.



中文翻译:

零售商是否应该与使用双渠道供应链的制造商讨价还价?

在本文中,我们研究了零售商是否应该与制造商就产品的批发价格讨价还价或接受制造商单方面确定的价格的问题。为了研究这个问题,我们开发了一个博弈论模型来描述由一个制造商和一个零售商组织的供应链。直观地说,如果有讨价还价的机会,零售商最好就批发价格讨价还价,而不是简单地接受制造商确定的价格。与这种直觉一致,我们首先展示了当制造商仅使用单渠道供应链时,零售商通过讨价还价获得更高利润的基准结果,其中制造商仅通过零售商进行销售。然而,反过来说,我们证明,这种直观的结果可以在双渠道供应链环境中完全逆转,在这种环境中,制造商不仅可以通过零售商销售产品,还可以直接向最终消费者销售产品。具体来说,我们发现,如果零售商的议价能力足够强,并且如果消费者在渠道之间的可替代性相当高,则完全接受制造商规定的批发价格将使零售商获得比讨价还价更高的利润。这种违反直觉的结果对双渠道环境下的零售商来说是一个警告,因为如果零售商不接受制造商规定的批发价格,而轻率地利用其强大的实力与制造商讨价还价,最终可能会伤害自己并减少自己的利润。 .

更新日期:2021-09-24
down
wechat
bug