Because poverty and natural resource conservation are multi-dimensional, complex interactive processes, ecological compensation (EC) mechanism, which is global environmental resource management policy instruments, have become important tools for poverty alleviation. This study developed a unified analysis framework that incorporated a tripartite evolutionary game that included EC-investors, who promote eco-compensated poverty alleviation, EC-providers, and superior government regulators. Based on proposed dynamic replicator equations, the evolution and steady state strategies for each of these stakeholders were then separately discussed. A numerical study based on the observable conditions in an eco-compensated poverty alleviation project was conducted to examine the asymptotic stability of the various evolutionary stabilization strategies. The results show that the government regulator's strategic choices act as a "weathervane" for the other two players, and the choice of the superior government regulator depends on the expected benefits and costs of the strategy. The strategic choices made by the EC-providers are significantly influenced by the EC-investor strategy choices, with a sufficient ecological transfer payment being the main motivation for the providers to participate in the eco-compensated poverty alleviation projects.

由于贫困与自然资源保护是多维、复杂的互动过程，作为全球环境资源管理政策工具的生态补偿（EC）机制已成为扶贫的重要工具。本研究开发了一个统一的分析框架，其中包含三方演化博弈，其中包括促进生态补偿扶贫的 EC 投资者、EC 提供者和上级政府监管机构。基于提议的动态复制器方程，然后分别讨论了每个利益相关者的演化和稳态策略。基于生态补偿扶贫项目的可观察条件进行了数值研究，以检验各种演化稳定策略的渐近稳定性。结果表明，政府监管者的战略选择对其他两个参与者起到了“风向标”的作用，而上级政府监管者的选择取决于该战略的预期收益和成本。EC 提供者的战略选择受 EC 投资者战略选择的显着影响，充足的生态转移支付是提供者参与生态补偿扶贫项目的主要动力。