This article explores Jan Patočka’s notion of “asubjective phenomenology,” which the Czech philosopher elaborated in the mature phase of his thought. More specifically, it proposes to analyze that notion in light of Patočka’s interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, in which he identifies the original, though implicit, possibility of a phenomenology independent of a subjective foundation. In the first part of the paper, the author offers an interpretation of Husserls’ concept of “theory in general” as the original model of the Patočkan phenomenal field, which, just like the logical dimension thematized by Husserl in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, is independent of both objective structures and subjective conditions. It is reasonable to assume that the absence, in Logical Investigations, of “transcendental consciousness,” inspired Patočka in conceiving the manifestation of the object as a thing’s “showing-itself.” This idea is advanced in the second part of the article. Lastly, the final section of the article discusses the concept of “representative” (the sensory content of the intentional act representation) as the second and most significant seed of “asubjective phenomenology” that can be retraced in Husserl’s Logical Investigations.

本文探讨了扬·帕托奇卡 (Jan Patočka) 的“非主观现象学”概念，这位捷克哲学家在其思想的成熟阶段对其进行了阐述。更具体地说，它建议根据帕托奇卡对埃德蒙·胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》的解释来分析这个概念，他在其中确定了独立于主观基础的现象学的原始但隐含的可能性。在论文的第一部分，作者将胡塞尔的“一般理论”概念解释为帕托奇坎现象场的原始模型，就像胡塞尔在《纯逻辑导论》中主题化的逻辑维度一样 ，独立于客观结构和主观条件。可以合理地假设不存在，在“超验意识”的逻辑研究启发了帕托奇卡将对象的表现设想为事物的“自我展示”。这个想法在文章的第二部分被提出。最后，文章的最后一部分讨论了“代表性”的概念（有意行为表征的感官内容）作为“非主观现象学”的第二个也是最重要的种子，可以在胡塞尔的逻辑研究中追溯。