Ride-sourcing services have experienced dramatic growth over the past decade but aroused debates on whether and how the government should regulate the ride-sourcing platform. To tackle this critical issue, this paper investigates the regulatory outcomes of various representative government regulations, including price-cap regulation, vehicle fleet size control, wage (per-order) regulation, income (hourly earnings) regulation, car utilization rate regulation, commission charge regulation, etc. In particular, we try to answer two key questions: (1) whether a regulation leads to a Pareto-efficient outcome; (2) what are the impacts of the regulations on the platform’s decisions and the resulting realized passenger demand and driver supply. By conducting theoretical and numerical studies, we offer some interesting and useful managerial insights for the government in designing appropriate regulations. Notably, some prevailing regulations, such as fleet size control and wage regulation, fail to achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome, while the maximum commission regulation and minimum service level (demand) regulation can achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes in markets with homogeneous drivers and mild traffic congestion. In addition, drivers’ heterogeneity and traffic congestion substantially affect the regulatory outcomes of various regulations. For example, in markets with homogeneous drivers, the income regulation does not take effect, while in markets with heterogeneous drivers, the income regulation does influence the platform’s decisions but still cannot achieve a Pareto-efficient outcome. We also show that the government acts quite differently under mild or heavy traffic congestion: it tends to encourage more drivers to participate in the market by a minimum fleet size regulation when traffic congestion is light, but restrain the vehicle fleet size by a maximum fleet size regulation when traffic congestion is severe.

在过去十年中，拼车服务经历了巨大的增长，但引发了关于政府是否以及如何监管拼车平台的争论。为了解决这个关键问题，本文调查了各种代表性政府法规的监管结果，包括价格上限监管、车队规模控制、工资（按订单）监管、收入（小时收入）监管、汽车利用率监管、佣金特别是，我们试图回答两个关键问题：（1）监管是否导致帕累托有效结果；(2) 法规对平台的决策以及由此产生的已实现的乘客需求和司机供给有什么影响。通过进行理论和数值研究，我们为政府设计适当的法规提供了一些有趣且有用的管理见解。值得注意的是，一些现行法规，例如车队规模控制和工资监管，未能实现帕累托有效的结果，而最大佣金监管和最低服务水平（需求）监管可以在具有同质驱动程序和温和的市场中实现帕累托有效的结果。交通拥堵。此外，司机的异质性和交通拥堵极大地影响了各种法规的监管结果。例如，在具有同质驱动因素的市场中，收入监管不生效，而在具有异质驱动因素的市场中，收入监管确实会影响平台的决策，但仍然无法达到帕累托有效的结果。