ABSTRACT

An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: what is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology—including quite similar ones—remain ‘epistemically inert’? I will argue that, to overcome this objection, the phenomenal dogmatist should incorporate into her view a general principle—I call it the ‘experiential attitude/doxastic content link’ principle—that essentially extends the view from the perceptual case to other phenomenal states.

摘要

越来越多的认识论者捍卫这样一种观念，即某些感知经验可以立即证明某些信念的合理性，并凭借其（某些）现象属性来证明这一点。但这种观点，我们可以称之为现象教条主义，也是各种反对的对象。在这里，我想考虑一个可以提出如下的反对意见：感知现象学有什么特别之处，以至于只有它才能立即证明信念的合理性，而其他类型的现象学——包括非常相似的现象学——仍然是“认识上惰性的”？我认为，为了克服这一反对意见，现象教条主义者应该在她的观点中纳入一个普遍原则——我称之为“经验态度/信念内容联系”原则——本质上将观点从感知案例扩展到其他现象状态。