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Who captures whom? Regulatory misperceptions and the timing of cognitive capture
Regulation & Governance ( IF 3.203 ) Pub Date : 2021-09-18 , DOI: 10.1111/rego.12438
Georg Rilinger 1
Affiliation  

To explain cognitive capture, economic sociologists often examine the structure of relationships between regulators and market participants. This paper argues that the nature of regulators' misperception should be subject to analysis as well. Different types of misperceptions develop over timelines of varying lengths. Depending on the misperception, different sets of relationships and parties may therefore be the cause of regulators' capture. The paper illustrates this point with a case study of regulators' failure to detect pervasive market power in California's electricity markets between 1998 and 2001. Existing explanations focus on sellers' short-term attempts to distract regulators from widespread evidence of market power. Using data from three archives and in-depth interviews, I show that the regulators did not fall prey to such “information problems.” Instead, their misperception resulted from a more foundational “worldview problem.” This error affects regulators' basic conception of the marketplace and can be traced to earlier and more gradual forms of influence exerted by utilities that, ironically, would become the victims of market power.

中文翻译:

谁抓谁?监管误解和认知捕获的时间

为了解释认知捕获,经济社会学家经常研究监管者和市场参与者之间的关系结构。本文认为,监管机构误解的性质也应该受到分析。不同类型的误解会随着时间长度的不同而发展。根据误解,不同的关系和各方可能因此成为监管机构捕获的原因。该论文通过监管机构未能发现 1998 年至 2001 年间加利福尼亚电力市场普遍存在的市场力量的案例研究说明了这一点。现有的解释集中在卖方的短期尝试,以分散监管机构对市场力量广泛证据的注意力。使用来自三个档案和深度访谈的数据,我表明监管机构并没有成为这种“信息问题”的牺牲品。相反,他们的误解源于更根本的“世界观问题”。这个错误影响了监管者对市场的基本概念,并且可以追溯到公用事业更早和更渐进的影响形式,具有讽刺意味的是,这些影响将成为市场力量的受害者。
更新日期:2021-09-18
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