This paper is concerned with the design of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) against fault detectors (FD) for linear cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The purpose of the attacker is to design an stealthy attack scheme such that the defenders cannot detect the faults in time or fail to detect the faults, and at the same time the robustness of the CPS is deteriorated. Unlike the existing optimal attack strategies (OASs) that are established based on sufficient conditions, necessary and sufficient conditions (NASCs) are established to maximize the degradation of the FD performance and robustness of CPS while maintaining stealth. Subsequently, an OAS is constructed by solving coupled backward recursive Riccati difference equations (RDEs). Finally, two simulation examples are employed to show the effectiveness of the designed attack scheme.

本文涉及针对线性网络物理系统 (CPS) 的故障检测器 (FD) 的虚假数据注入攻击 (FDIA) 的设计。攻击者的目的是设计一种隐蔽的攻击方案，使得防御者无法及时发现故障或未能检测到故障，同时降低CPS的鲁棒性。与现有的基于充分条件建立的最优攻击策略（OAS）不同，充分必要条件（NASC）的建立是为了在保持隐身的同时最大限度地降低FD性能和CPS的鲁棒性。随后，通过求解耦合后向递归 Riccati 差分方程 (RDE) 来构建 OAS。最后，通过两个仿真实例来说明所设计攻击方案的有效性。