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Super platforms, big data, and competition law: the Japanese approach in contrast with the USA and EU
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Pub Date : 2020-12-03 , DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa053
Toshiaki Takigawa

ABSTRACT
This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.


中文翻译:

超级平台、大数据和竞争法:日本方法与美国和欧盟的对比

摘要
本文探讨了有关配备大数据的数字平台的反垄断问题。重点介绍了日本竞争管理机构最近的举措,并将其与美国和欧盟竞争管理机构的举措进行了比较。首先考察平台之间的竞争是否会导致少数几个具有市场支配力的超级平台,结论是人工智能与机器学习增强了具有强大人工智能能力的超级平台的力量,导致平台收购合并控制的重要性增加。接下来仔细审查的是对超级平台实施公用事业监管的论点,结论是广泛的支持仅限于数据可移植性,让竞争法成为解决超级平台的关键工具,其核心工具是禁止排他性行为的规定,执行哪一个,最初,担心是否订购超级平台,让他们的竞争对手可以访问他们的数据。需要根据基本设施原则仔细审查被动拒绝共享数据。除了被动拒绝,平台的排他性行为要求竞争管理机构权衡该行为的排他性影响与其效率影响。最后讨论的是剥削性滥用,解释了其与消费者保护的关系,并得出结论认为,应尽量减少对剥削性滥用的竞争法执法,因为它伴随着过度执法的风险。平台的排他性行为要求竞争管理机构权衡该行为的排他性影响与其效率影响。最后讨论的是剥削性滥用,解释了其与消费者保护的关系,并得出结论认为,应尽量减少对剥削性滥用的竞争法执法,因为它伴随着过度执法的风险。平台的排他性行为要求竞争管理机构权衡该行为的排他性影响与其效率影响。最后讨论的是剥削性滥用,解释了其与消费者保护的关系,并得出结论认为,应尽量减少对剥削性滥用的竞争法执法,因为它伴随着过度执法的风险。
更新日期:2020-12-03
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